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ABSTRACT
Free web proxies promise anonymity and censorship circumvention
at no cost. Several websites publish lists of free proxies organized
by country, anonymity level, and performance. These lists index
hundreds of thousand of hosts discovered via automated tools and
crowd-sourcing. A complex free proxy ecosystem has been forming
over the years, of which very little is known. In this paper we shed
light on this ecosystem via ProxyTorrent, a distributed measurement
platform that leverages both active and passive measurements. Ac-
tive measurements discover free proxies, assess their performance,
and detect potential malicious activities. Passive measurements re-
late to proxy performance and usage in the wild, and are collected by
free proxies users via a Chrome plugin we developed. ProxyTorrent
has been running since January 2017, monitoring up to 180,000 free
proxies and totaling more than 1,500 users. Our analysis shows that
less than 2% of the proxies announced on the web indeed proxy
traffic on behalf of users; further, only half of these proxies have
decent performance and can be used reliably. Around 10% of the
working proxies exhibit malicious behaviors, e.g., ads injection and
TLS interception, and these proxies are also the ones providing the
best performance. Through the analysis of more than 2 Terabytes
of proxied traffic, we show that web browsing is the primary user
activity. Geo-blocking avoidance is not a prominent use-case, with
the exception of countries hosting popular geo-blocked content.
1 INTRODUCTION
Web proxies are intermediary boxes enabling HTTP (sometimes
also HTTPS) connections between a client and a server. They are
widely used for security, privacy, performance optimization or policy
enforcement, to cite a few use cases. Many web proxies are free of
charge and publicly available. Such proxies can be used, for example,
for private web surfing and to access content that would be blocked
otherwise (e.g., due to geographical restrictions).
Specialized forums, websites, and even VPN service providers1
compile daily lists of free web proxies. When tested, most of these
proxies are slow, unreachable or not even real proxies. Furthermore,
it is folklore that free web proxies perform malicious activities, e.g.,
injection of advertisements and user fingerprinting. It is fair to say
that free proxies form a massive and complex ecosystem of which
very little is known. For example, what is the magnitude of the
ecosystem and how many proxies are safe to use? How and for what
are these proxies used? Answering these questions is hard because
of the sale of the ecosystem and because it involves two players out
of reach: free proxies and their users.
*Work done while at Telefonica Research
1For example, https://hide.me
, https://doi.org/10.1145/nnnnnnn.nnnnnnn.
In this work we tackle the above challenge by building ProxyTor-
rent, a distributed measurement platform of the free proxy ecosys-
tem. ProxyTorrent leverages our premises to actively discover and
assess the performance of the core of the ecosystem that can be
used safely. Usage statistics are instead passively (and anonymously)
collected at free proxy users in exchange of high-quality proxies list
compiled by ProxyTorrent.
ProxyTorrent is daily fed with tens of thousands potential prox-
ies obtained by crawling the most popular free proxies aggregator
websites. Potential proxies are quickly tested in order to discard the
ones that are unreachable, do not proxy traffic, or perform malicious
activities. This is done by loading a “bait” webpage we have crafted
as well as few popular webpages, and comparing the content re-
ceived via the proxy with the one received when no proxy was set.
The same approach is used to detect issues with X.509 certificates in
case of TLS connections. These operations run daily at our premises
and generate a few thousand trusted proxies. Next, we test the per-
formance of trusted proxies from ∼ 30 network locations (Planetlab
nodes [16]) while fetching the landing pages of popular websites via
both HTTP and HTTPS. Collected data is finally used to populate a
list of good proxies, i.e., working and trustworthy free proxies.
This list of good proxies is then offered to a Chrome plugin
(Ciao [3, 17]) we developed to help users interacting with the free
proxy ecosystem. Ciao users select a target anonymity level and
country, and the plugin automatically identifies the best free proxy
for the task, if any. As the user browse the Internet through the proxy,
we collect anonymous statistics on free proxy performance and how
they are used in the wild.
We use data collected by ProxyTorrent to provide a unique
overview of the free proxy ecosystem. In this paper we present
ten months worth of data spanning up to 180,000 free web proxies
and more than 1,500 users. The analysis of this data-set reveals the
following key findings:
The free proxy ecosystem is large and ever-growing, but only a
small fraction of the announced proxies actually works. While
thousands of new free proxies are announced daily, overall, less
than 2% of them are reachable and correctly proxy traffic. Further,
half of these proxies stop working after few days. Many reasons are
behind such ephemeral behavior: host misconfigurations, dynamic
addressing, and even bait proxies from VPN providers aiming at
attracting more customers.
A non negligible percentage of working proxies are suspicious,
but provide better performance than safe proxies. Every day,
around 10% of the working proxies announced on the Web exhibit
suspicious behavior, from injection of advertisements to TLS man-
in-the-middle attempts. On average, these proxies are twice as fast
as non-malicious ones. Fast connectivity is likely used to attract
potential “victims”, supporting the general belief that free proxies
are “free for a reason”.
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The geographical distribution of proxies is fairly skewed. Half
of the working free proxies reside in a handful of countries, with US,
France, and China at the top. While US and China are at the top due
to their sizes, the presence of large cloud providers in France is the
reason behind such large number of proxies.
Geo-blocking avoidance is not a prominent use-case for free
web proxies. By analyzing 2 TBytes of traffic generated by 1,500
Ciao users over 7 months, we conclude that web browsing is the
most prominent activity. Proxy are rarely selected in the same loca-
tion where a visited website resides, which suggests that circumven-
tion of potential geo-blocking rules is not a primary user concern.
Some countries like the US are an exception though, likely because
hosting a lot of popular geo-blocked content.
2 BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK
Background – A web proxy is a device/application that acts as an
intermediary for HTTP(S) requests, such as GET and CONNECT,
issued by clients seeking resources on servers. Web proxies are com-
monly classified as transparent, anonymous, and elite, depending on
the degree of anonymity they provide.
Transparent proxies reveal the IP address of the client to the origin
server, e.g., by adding the X-FORWARDED-FOR header which spec-
ifies the address of the client. Anonymous proxies block headers that
may allow the origin server to detect the identity of the client, but
still announce themselves as proxies, e.g., by adding the HTTP_VIA
header. Elite proxies do not send any of the above headers and look
just like regular clients to the origin server. Yet, the origin server may
detect that a proxy is being used by probing the IP address extracted
from the received traffic to check if it acts as a proxy.
Related Work – We briefly overview relevant results from related
work and highlight differences with ProxyTorrent.
Free Web Proxies. Scott et al., [19] also study free web proxies
but both their goal and methodology differ from ours. While our
goal is a complete view of the free proxy ecosystem, they mostly
focus on how and for what free proxies are used. They do so by
scanning the IPv4 address space at popular proxy ports (e.g., 3128,
8080, and 8123) looking for open management interfaces (i.e., proxy
interfaces with no authentication required) from which they can
“steal” usage statistics. This approach is intended to run seldomly
due to the cost associated with IPv4 scanning. Further, it raises some
ethical concerns related to exposing hosts found via scanning as well
as intruding their management interfaces. ProxyTorrent was instead
designed with both scalability and user privacy in mind. Note that
we once ran a full scan of the IPv4 address space at popular proxy
ports to compare with our methodology (see Table 2).
ProxyTorrent shares some similarities with proxycheck [7], a
tool that can check the behavior of a proxy by using it to download
few distinct objects hosted on a private webserver. Next, it labels a
proxy as untrusted if the retrieved objects differ from the original
ones even by a single bit, potentially generating a large number of
false positives. Proxies are tested one at a time, which only allows
to test ∼10,000 proxies a day. Despite some similarities, our ap-
proach is fundamentally different since we designed a funnel-shaped
methodology (see Figure 1) aiming to minimize false positives while
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Figure 1: ProxyTorrent system overview.
maximizing performance, e.g., scaling up to hundreds of thousands
proxies per day.
In-path Manipulations. A number of papers measure in-path web
content manipulations by leveraging bait content served from a con-
trolled host. Reis et al., [18] focus on middleboxes and serve a page
with an embedded JavaScript that detects and reports modifications.
Their data-set contains 50,000 unique visits to their website, totaling
650 instances of content manipulation. Chung et al., [2] use the paid
version of Hola [8] (a peer-to-peer proxy network) to detect end-to-
end violation in DNS, HTTP, and HTTPS traffic. They witness DNS
hijacking, HTTP manipulations, image transcoding, and a few cases
of TLS man-in-the-middle attempts. Many of the violations reported
in [2] are attributed to ISPs and to (malicious) software running
at Hola proxying peers. Tyson et al., [20] use the same approach
to investigate HTTP header manipulations. They leverage Hola to
gather 143k vantage points in 3,818 Autonomous Systems (ASes)
and detect header manipulation in about 25% of the ASes. Weaver et
al., [22] focus on transparent proxies using Netalyzr [10] and detect
HTTP proxy manipulations for 14% of the connections.
Differently from all of the above, we look at performance and
content manipulations of free, non-transparent web proxies. We use
bait content served from a controlled host, as well as real websites.
Our measurement platform also leverages real users by means of a
plugin that provides easy proxy usage in exchange of anonymous
statistics on how proxies are used in the wild.
Virtual Private Networks. Perta et al., [14] study privacy leaks in
commercial VPN systems. Despite a VPN tunnel, they discover the
following traffic leakages. First, IPv6 traffic is usually not tunneled.
Second, poor management of the DNS configuration at the client
may result in an adversary hijacking DNS requests and learning
which websites a user visit. Similar issues are also reported by Ikram
et al., [9] that analyze 283 Android VPN apps. The authors of [9]
also detect VPN apps with embedded tracking libraries and malware.
Differently from these works, we focus on free web proxies that
are a valid alternative to commercial VPNs in use-cases such as
accessing geoblocked content. Apart from their behavior, we further
assess their performance.
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Phase I Phase II Phase III.A Phase III.B Phase IV
# clients 1 1 1 ∼30 up to 1,500
tools beautifoulsoup curl PhantomJS/curl/OpenSSL curl Chrome plugin
main task web-crawling fetch 1KB synthetic object fetch syntetic webpage fetch real webpages interface with free proxies
main goal find potential proxies find working proxies test behavior test performance monitor performance and usage
frequency daily daily, on-demand daily every 5 minutes user-controlled
classification potential working/unresponsible/
unreachable/other
trusted/suspicious/unrated trusted/suspicious/unrated —
Table 1: Key aspects of each phase in ProxyTorrent.
3 PROXYTORRENT
This section describes ProxyTorrent, a distributed measurement
platform built to monitor the free proxy ecosystem. Figure 1 shows
an overview of the full system.
Due to the scale of the proxy ecosystem — potentially millions
of machines [19] — we use a funnel-shaped methodology with
several phases (see Figure 1). Proxies are fed into the funnel and,
at each phase, go through a series of tests of increasing complexity.
Only proxies that pass a given phase are admitted to the next one.
Since each phase decreases the number of proxies under test, we can
progressively increase test complexity. The last phase takes place
at real proxy users, allowing to complement results of controlled
experiments with measurements in the wild. Table 1 lists the key
aspects of each phase. In the remainder of this section, we describe
all phases in detail.
Phase I discovers free proxies (<ip, port> pairs) on the Internet
by crawling several aggregator websites which regularly publish
free proxy lists. Daily crawling runs from a single machine at our
premises. The hosts discovered are used to populate a list of “poten-
tial proxies” sorted by the last day when each proxy appeared on
any of the webistes we crawl.
Phase II tests the potential proxies populated by Phase I for proxy-
ing capability. We use curl [4], instrumented for full statistics and
headers collection, to fetch a 1KB object via each potential proxy.
The content is served using nginx [13] from a server hosted by Ama-
zon (Ireland). Phase II runs daily from a single machine. It traverses
the potential proxies list in order, and runs for up to 24 hours until
either all proxies have been tested or time is over. This strategy
rules out the least recently crawled potential proxies, in case the list
becomes too big to be processed in a day.
Each proxy is associated to a similarity score computed as the
ratio of common content across the webpage fetch performed with
and without the proxy. Accordingly, a similarity score of 1 means
that the content fetched through the proxy is identical to one fetched
without a proxy.
Phase II categorizes hosts as follows. Unresponsive: hosts for
which either a connection or max duration timeout was triggered.2
Unreachable: hosts that either closed the TCP connection with a
reset message or sent ICMP messages declaring the network or the
requested host as unreachable. Working: hosts with a similarity score
≥ 0.5, i.e., that have correctly proxied at least 50% of the 1KB object
2We measured empirically that 3 seconds (TCP handshake) and 30 seconds (maximum
duration) are long enough for 95% of the proxies.
we serve. This threshold was empirically chosen to discard proxies
returning errors or login pages, for which we empirically measured
similarity scores lower than 0.3, on average. Note that proxies that
largely alter a webpage might be caught in this rule as well. This is
fine as far as finding safe working proxies, but it prevents the full
behavioral analysis from phase III thus generating false negatives
(see Section 4.2). We further classify working proxies as transparent,
anonymous, or elite (see Section 2) using HTTP headers collected
both at the client and at the server. HTTP headers of all proxies are
also analyzed to identify header manipulations that can be potentially
malicious. Finally, Maxmind [12] is also used to obtain country/AS
information of each working proxy. Other: all remaining hosts that
relay content substantially different from the expected one, e.g., all
the hosts returning a login page (private or paid proxies) or an error
page (misconfigured hosts).
Phase III tests working proxies with respect to behavior and perfor-
mance. To assess a proxy behavior, we use the previous methodology
of comparing proxied content with content received when no proxy
is used. Compared to Phase II, we introduce a headless browser, real
content, HTTPS testing, and clients at multiple locations. For perfor-
mance, we measure both page download time (PDT) and page load
time (PLT). PDT is the time required to download the index page
of a website; PLT is the time from when a browser starts fetching
a website to the firing of the JavaScript onLoad() event, which
occurs once the page’s embedded resources have been downloaded,
but possibly before all objects loaded via scripts are downloaded.
Phase III consists of two parts (A and B) which both operate on the
set of working proxies identified by Phase II within the last 7 days.
Phase III.A runs daily from a single machine at our premises. It
uses PhantomJS [15], a popular headless browser, to fetch a realistic
website we serve. We designed the website to include elements
that could trigger content manipulation by a proxy: a landing page
index.html (83.7KB), two javascripts (635B and 22.9KB),
two png images (1.5KB and 13.5KB), and a favicon (4.3KB).
Our bait webpage is similar to the one set up by related work that
looks for en-route content manipulation [2].
Data is collected as an HTTP Archive (HAR); for this, we have
extended PhantomJS’s HAR capturer3 to also dump the actual con-
tent downloaded. The HAR file includes detailed information about
which object was loaded and when, as well as PLT. We stop Phan-
tomJS either one second after the onLoad() event, to allow for
potentially pending objects to be downloaded, or after a 45 second
3http://phantomjs.org/network-monitoring.html
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maximum duration timeout. Compared to Phase II, we increase the
maximum duration timeout to account for an overall more complex
operation.
Phase III.A also checks for issues with X.509 certificates. First,
we use curl to connect to our server over port 433 and compare the
X.509 certificate presented to the client with our original certificate
(provided by LetsEncrypt [11]). If curl detects any issue with the
certificate, we use OpenSSL to download the X.509 certificates from
our website as well as from two popular websites.4
Phase III.A classifies a working proxy as trusted, suspicious, or
unrated. Trusted proxies serve the expected content with no alter-
ation and do not replace or modify X.509 certificates. Suspicious
proxies alter the relayed traffic, e.g., by adding unsolicited content
or by not relaying the expected X.509 certificates. Finally, unrated
proxies operate at such a slow speed that they are incapable to serve
the full content requested within the maximum duration allowed.
The partial content they serve is as expected, otherwise we mark
them as suspicious. Phase III.A quantifies the performance of trusted
and suspicious proxies using the PLT of our realistic website.
Phase III.B runs daily from 30 Planetlab nodes. Curl is used to fetch,
via each proxy in the working proxy list, the landing pages of Alexa’s
top websites. Precisely, we construct two 1,000-website lists from
Alexa with support for HTTP and HTTPS, respectively. For each
proxy and fetched page, Phase III.B reports both PDT and similarity
score. Proxies are tested mostly against HTTP websites; only once
every 10 tests a proxy is also tested for HTTPS support by fetching
a random website from the HTTPS list. We empirically measured
that phase III.B is currently capable of testing each working proxy
at least once every 5 minutes.
Phase IV allows to both test free web proxies in the wild, as well
as to learn how free proxies are used. It runs on the machines of the
users that installed Ciao,5 a Chrome plugin we developed to help
users finding free proxies. Users pick the desired anonymity level
(transparent, anonymous, elite) and location, and Ciao automatically
sets up a free proxy based on input from ProxyTorrent. In order to
minimize risk and maximize usability, we only consider proxies that
have been labeled as trusted in Phase III.A, and that have shown the
best performance in Phase III.B. At any time the user can request a
new proxy either to reflect a new preference or in case of failure.
Ciao reports statistics per download, which captures all the events
in a browser’s tab transitioning from one URL to another, usually in
response to directly typing a URL, refreshing or aborting the load of
a webpage, clicking a link within a page, etc. We leverage Chrome’s
webNavigation APIs to identify the beginning and end of a
download. For each download, the following statistics are collected:
timestamps associated to the beginning and end of a download, PLT,
number of requests per protocol type (HTTP/HTTPS), amount of
bytes downloaded (HTTP/HTTPS), navigation errors (if any). No
personal information, such as IP address, browser/OS information,
or URLs are reported at any time.
4https://www.theguardian.com and https://www.google.com
5https://goo.gl/y86fOy
Total Unresp. Unreach. Other Working
Crawling 0.16M 0.11M 0.04 8,000 2,895
Zmap 29.1M 17M 5.66M 6.4M. 2,518
8080 13.5M 6.6M 2.2M 4.7M 376
8081 7.2M 4.65M 1.55M 0.95M 171
8118 4.7M 3.45M 1.15 0.1M 1,093
3128 3.7M 2.29M 0.76M 0.65M 878
Table 2: Crawling and scanning (Zmap) summary, June 18th
2017. Results in the last four rows refer to scanning per port.
4 THE FREE PROXY ECOSYSTEM
This section characterizes the free proxy ecosystem. We first quan-
tify its magnitude and evolution over time. Next, we provide data
supporting (or not) the preconception that free proxies are mostly
malicious and tend to manipulate served content. We then conclude
by assessing the ecosystem performance and by providing some
evidence on how free proxies are used in the wild. We report on 10
months worth of data (January-October, 2017) spanning more than
180,000 proxies and 1,500 users.
Limitations We acknowledge from the outset the limitations of our
methodology. According to our findings, around 10% of the working
proxies every day exhibit malicious behavior by either injecting
content, manipulating headers, or by replacing X.509 certificates.
This is a lower bound to the fraction of malicious proxy since an
exhaustive behavioral analysis by only controlling a few clients and
servers is out of reach. We stress, however, that related work using a
setup similar to ours, shares the same limitations [2, 18, 20, 22].
A proxy could behave maliciously only in some cases in order
to avoid detection. For example, it may decide to manipulate con-
tent based on contextual factors, such as the client IP address, the
domain requested, etc. Our experiments indicate that only 20% of
the malicious proxies manipulate the content of each requested page
while many (40%) do so only for one out of ten pages requested.
Furthermore, there is no guarantee that a proxy that in our experi-
ment proxied traffic without alterations, will not manipulate content
when serving other users. Perhaps the content we requested or the IP
address of our clients simply did not trigger content manipulation at
the proxy. Another form of malicious behavior that we cannot fully
assess is user tracking and profiling. Our experiments reveal several
attempts to inject tracking/fingerprinting code, but we cannot rule
out that even innocent-looking proxies carry out user profiling by
simply leveraging the IP address of the user and her list of requests.
We nevertheless argue that ProxyTorrent improves the current situ-
ation for proxy users that are clueless on whether a given proxy is
performing any kind of malicious activity with the relayed traffic.
Furthermore, ProxyTorrent raises the bar for malicious proxies to
avoid detection.
4.1 Characterization
Magnitude. Table 2 shows a snapshot of the free proxy ecosystem
(June 18th, 2017). We chose this date since, at that time, we sup-
plemented ProxyTorrent’s crawling strategy by scanning the full
IPv4 space and targeting the most popular proxy ports according to
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Figure 2: Time evolution of host classification: unreachable, un-
responsive, working, and other.
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Figure 3: Time evolution of working proxies by category: un-
rated, trusted, and suspicious (either data or TLS certificate
manipulation)
the aggregator websites. Our goal is to understand the coverage of
the aggregator websites we crawl. IPv4 address scanning leverages
Zmap [5] from a number of machines we control. Because of the
ethical issues related to port-scanning, we run the scan only once.
While we test the found proxies to categorize them, we do not use
proxies found exclusively via scanning in the following experiments
nor we make them available to Ciao users.
Table 2 reports proxies obtained by crawling the aggregator web-
sites (first row), and the one found via port-scanning (second row).
The table distinguishes between four hosts categories: unreachable,
unresponsive, working, and other (see Section 3). Crawling yields a
higher ratio of working proxies (2,895 out of approximately 160k)
compared to port-scanning (2,518 out of more than 29M). Only
719 proxies appear in both data-sets. Regardless of the discovery
strategy, the table shows that most hosts are either unresponsive or
unreachable, and that only a few thousand hosts can actually be
labeled as working proxies. The last four rows of Table 2 show the
breakdown of the proxies discovered via scanning by port.
Figure 2 shows the evolution over time of each proxy category as
defined in Phase II. On the first day, we bootstrap ProxyTorrent with
a list of potential proxies containing 118,915 hosts (<ip, port> pairs)
collected on specialized forums. We then daily supplement such
list via crawling. Overall, the figure shows that the working proxy
category has a different trend than the others. While the number of
hosts in each category increases over time, the number of working
proxies oscillates between 900 and 3,000.
We now focus on the (small) core of working proxies for which
further testing was conducted. Figure 3 shows the evolution over
time of the active proxies, i.e., the set proxies that were reachable
during phase III.A at least once within a day. Figure 3 also shows
the evolution of the categories trusted, suspicious (split between
proxies that manipulate TLS certificates—cert. issue—and proxies
that manipulate actual content—manipulation), and unrated. 6
According to Figure 3, every day roughly 66% of active proxies
are marked as trustworthy, while around 24% are marked as unrated.
Suspicious proxies amount to 10% of the active, where 100-300
proxies manipulate proxied content and only a handful of them is
caught replacing X.509 certificates. On average, 40% of the proxies
support HTTPS. The drop observed in all curves at mid-June is
caused by a partial failure of our system resources.
Takeaway: The proxy ecosystem is characterized by a small and
volatile core of proxies surrounded by a large and increasing set
of non-proxy hosts that are erroneously announced on aggregator
websites.
Geo-location. Figure 4 and 5 show, for the top 20 countries and
ASes, both the total number of proxies they host and the amount of
suspicious ones. Both figures are computed considering all working
proxies observed at least once during the six months monitoring
period. USA (11%), France (9%) China (6.7%), Indonesia (6.6%),
Brazil (6.5%), and Russia (6%) host 45% of the proxies, while the
remainder is scattered across 160 countries. A similar distribution is
observable for suspicious proxies, with the main differences being
that China passes the US with respect to the number of suspicious
proxies and the gap with France increases. As for the hosting ASs,
about 28% of proxies are concentrated in only six ASs, while the
remaining proxies reside in 4,386 ASs. Both ISPs and cloud service
providers appear in the top 20 ASs.
(In)stability. Next, we explore the stability of the proxies located
in the (usable) core of the free proxy ecosystem. We report their
lifetime, the number of days between the first and the last time
a proxy has been active, and their uptime, the number of days a
proxy was active within its lifetime. Both metrics are derived using
a proxy’s IP address and port as an identifier; our estimates are thus
lower bounds in presence of dynamic addressing. Figure 6 shows
the CDF of lifetime and uptime over 10 months, distinguishing
between all proxies and the suspicious ones. Proxies tend to have a
long uptime, e.g., 55% of the proxies are available for their whole
lifetime, regardless if they are suspicious or not. The figure also
shows that suspicious proxies have a significantly shorter lifetime
6The curve cert. issue starts from mid February, when we added HTTPS support to
ProxyTorrent.
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Figure 5: Number of proxies per top 20 ASes.
compared to the rest of the ecosystem, e.g., a median lifetime of 15
versus 35 days.
Roughly half of the monitored proxies lasts up to a month. This
result suggests that free proxies are fairly unstable over time. This
can be due to dynamic addressing, for example when proxies run on
residential hosts where they get their IP assigned by a dhcp server.
Another possible reason is that some proxies serve public traffic due
to misconfigurations that are eventually discovered and fixed by their
administrator. The shorter lifetime measured for suspicious proxies
could also be intentional, i.e., frequent changes to the IP address
might be used as a mean to circumvent banning from remote servers.
Takeaway: The core of the free proxy ecosystem is characterized
by an high level of instability which makes locating a usable proxy
extremely challenging. Half of this core resides in a handful of
countries, with the US leading the pack of trusted proxies and China
the pack of suspicious ones.
4.2 Behavior
Differently from above, the following figures are aggregated statis-
tics over the 10 month monitoring period. We discovered 39,143
working proxies of which 16,700 (42%) are classified as unrated,
1,833 (4.5%) as suspicious and 20,610 (53.5%) as trusted. Exclud-
ing unrated proxies—that do not serve enough content to enable
a classification—8.2% of proxies are suspicious, and 91.8% are
trusted. This subsection focuses on suspicious proxies to comment
on their behavior in detail.
Suspicious Behavior Classification Content manipulated by sus-
picious proxies can be summarized as follows: html (74% of all
manipulated traffic), javascripts (24%), and images (2%).
Unsolicited content injection mostly consists of javascripts,
though we also spotted few php and image injections. Overall, we
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Figure 6: CDF of lifetime and uptime for all proxies and the
suspicious ones.
witnessed 228 unique manipulations of served content — this im-
plies that several proxies manipulate traffic in the same way. Also,
suspicious proxies do not manipulate traffic at each request: only
20% of them manipulate traffic all the time, while 40% do it less
than 10% of the time.
In order to better understand the purpose of content manipula-
tion, we resort to visual inspection. To minimize the effort, we first
cluster manipulated content using affinity propagation clustering [6].
Specifically, we consider each piece of altered or injected content as
a string and compute the distance matrix required by the clustering
algorithm using the edit distance between each pair of strings.
Among the output clusters, two of them cover about 60% of
the content manipulation instances. The first cluster contains 84
instances of ad injection code, of which 50 can be linked to two
companies that provide hotspot monetization services. The second
cluster contains 47 instances of fingerprinting/tracking code, mostly
javascript code that attempts to identify a user. Thirty out those
47 instances include rum.js, a popular library to monitor user-
webpage interactions. Although rum.js is commonly used by CDN
providers, there is no apparent motivation for a free proxy to inject
such code.
The remaining clusters include the following instances of in-
jected code. Nine instances, imputable to only two proxies, display
religious-related content. Four times we witness metadata of pyweb,
a popular proxy rewriting tool for live web content. Pyweb’s meta-
data triggerered our detection, but further inspection shows no actual
content rewriting. Finally, we could not figure out the semantics of
the remaining 84 content manipulations either because they were
obfuscated or because they were only a few bytes in size.
Takeaway: Few content manipulation strategies exist that are shared
among many proxies, advertisement injection being the most fre-
quent one. Suspicious proxies do not manipulate traffic constantly;
ProxyTorrent’s continuous monitoring is thus paramount to detect
such proxies.
Invalid X.509 Certificates HTTPS is supported by 17,350 prox-
ies (about 44% of the working proxies) and 0.9% of them (173
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Figure 8: Header manipulation: response headers.
proxies) were caught interfering with TLS handshakes. The most
common behavior among such proxies is to replace the original
certificate with a self-signed one showing vague CommonName at-
tributes such as “https” or “US”. Three proxies provide certificates
with CommonName matching the original domain but signed by
“Zecurion Zgate Web”, a company offering corporate gateways to
mitigate information exfiltration, and “Olofeo.com”, a French com-
pany that offers managed security services. Only one proxy delivers
a certificate chain of size two, where the leaf certificate has the
expected CommonName but the root certificate has CommonName
set to “STATESTATESTATESTATESTATE”). The issuer of this
certificate is wscert.com, a domain expired as of February 2017.
Takeaway: Attempts of TLS interception are rare in the free proxy
ecosystem. Modern browsers would easily detect these potential
attacks and inform the user. Yet previous work has shown that users
tend to click through warnings [1].
Header Analysis We now analyze HTTP request and response
headers with the two-fold objective of understanding the level of
anonymity provided by proxies, and if header manipulations by free
proxies goes beyond traffic anonymization. First, we focus on the
working proxies observed at least once during six months. Then, we
extend our analysis to proxies categorized as other, i.e., proxies that
relay a webpage that differs more than 50% from our bait webpage
(see Phase II in Section 3).
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Figure 9: CDF of average PLT per proxy distinguishing be-
tween suspicious, all, and best performing proxies.
Figure 7 shows the top 10 request header modifications and in-
jections observed. Via, X-Proxy-ID, X-Forwarded-For, and
Connection are the most frequently added headers. The first two
headers are used by proxies to announce themselves to origin servers,
while the third one specifies the client IP address to the origin server,
when the proxy acts transparently. By leveraging those headers we
classify proxies as: 1) transparent (77%), proxies that reveal the
original client IP to the server; 2) anonymous (6%), proxies that
preserve client anonymity but reveal their presence to the server;
3) elite (17%), proxies that preserve client anonymity and do not
announce themselves to the origin server.
Connection is another frequently injected header. Roughly
60% of the proxies tested set it to close or keep-alive. This
behavior is not surprising as this header is reserved for point-to-point
communication, i.e., between client and proxy or between server
and proxy. The Proxy-Connection header plays a similar role,
and it is also added in about 10% of cases. Cache-Control is
the only request header which is altered; about 10% of proxies
modify this header to accept cached content with a given max-age
value, despite our testing tools explicitly specify not to serve cached
content. We also observe that less than 1% of proxies (not shown in
Figure 7) modify the user-agent by either removing it or specifying
their own agents. While the exposure of the client user-agent reduces
anonymity, it allows the server to optimize the content served based
on the user device and application.
Figure 8 shows the top 10 response header modifications and
injections performed by working proxies. As for the request headers,
the Via header is among the most frequently injected one; this is
used by proxies to to announce themselves and their protocol capabil-
ities to clients. About 30% of proxies also add the X-Cache header
to specify if the requested content was served from the proxy’s cache
or if a previously cached response is available. The most frequently
modified header is the Connection header, that is either removed
(50% of cases) or set to close. As previously stated, this is a com-
mon behavior as this header is connection specific and does not need
to be propagated to the client. Finally, less than 10% of the proxies
modify the Server header to reflect the software they use, rather
than the one of the origin server.
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Figure 10: Proxy usage and geo-location analysis.
We now focus on proxies categorized as others. Similar obser-
vations as above hold; in addition, we observe a non negligible
amount of Set-Cookie (5%), Access-Control-Allow-*
(1%), and X-Adblock-Key (0.5%) headers in response to clients.
The Set-Cookie header pushes a cookie to the client that may
be used for tracking. The Access-Control-Allow-* headers
are used to grant permission to clients to access resources from a
different origin domain than the one currently in use. Both headers
expose clients to malicious or unintended activities; however, they
are also frequent for private and enterprise proxies. Because similar
headers were not observed, at this scale, for the working proxies,
we conclude that this behavior is unlikely malicious. Conversely,
the X-Adblock-Key response header allows ads to be displayed
at clients bypassing ad-blocker tools. Proxies injecting this header
likely return a modified version of our “bait” webpage including
extra advertisements, which largely departs from the original page
(similarity score < 0.5). Proxies categorized as others were between
30,000 and 40,000; this analysis suggests that the similarity score
rule introduces about 150-200 false negatives or about 1%.
Takeaway: HTTP header analysis reveals that the free proxy ecosys-
tem is mostly composed of transparent proxies which announce
themselves and/or reveal the client’s IP address to the origin server.
Suspicious header manipulation is rare; when present, it aims at
ensuring that injected advertisements are not filtered by ad-blockers.
4.3 Performance
We now investigate the performance of the free proxy ecosystem,
or how fast can free proxies deliver content to their users. We use
page load time (PLT) as a performance metric since it accurately
quantifies end user experience [21]. However, PLT also depends on
the composition of a webpage, i.e., its overall size and complexity in
terms of number of objects. Accordingly, it has to be noted that PLT
values from experiments in Phase III refer to our synthetic webpage—
small size and only few objects—while PLT values for experiments
in Phase IV refer to proxies usage in the wild, i.e., overall bigger
webpages with hundreds of embedded objects.
Figure 9 shows the CDF of the average PLT measured through
each proxy, distinguishing between suspicious proxies (suspicious),
all proxies in the ecosystem (working), and the best performing prox-
ies ProxyTorrent offers to its users via Ciao (top). PLT values for
both all and suspicious proxies are measured in Phase III, while PLT
values for top proxies are measured in Phase IV. Failed downloads,
where no PLT was measured are not taken into account.
Figure 9 shows that suspicious proxies are faster than other prox-
ies in the ecosystem, e.g., the median PLT they provide is 2.5x
faster (7 seconds versus 18). The figure also shows that ProxyTor-
rent correctly identifies the best performing proxies since their PLT
measured at the user is 15% faster than the rest of the ecosystem.
Takeaway: Suspicious proxies are, on average, twice as fast as safe
proxies. Faster connectivity may be used by malicious proxy as a bait
to attract more potential victims. Our finding support the popular
belief that free proxies are “free for a reason”.
4.4 Usage
We released Ciao—our Chrome plugin to facilitate discovery and
usage of free proxies—on the Chrome Web store on March 17th
2017, and announced it via email, social media, and few forums
on free proxies, anonymity, censorship circumvention, etc. At the
time of writing Ciao has been installed by more than 1,500 users
who generated about 1,3 Millions downloads, totaling 2 TBytes of
HTTP/HTTPS traffic (1.5/0.5 TBytes, respectively).
We start by investigating user preferences in terms of both proxy
location and anonymity level. While for 70% of the queries the users
did specify a country preference, they requested a specific anonymity
level only for 16% of their queries. This indicates that users are
overall more interested in the proxy location than its anonymity
level. According to user preferences, anonymity levels can be ranked
as follows: transparent proxies (7%), elite (5%), and anonymous
(4%). With respect to proxy locations, only 20% of the queries are
concentrated in the 10 most popular locations (see Figure 10(a)),
while the remainder 80% are spread across 120 countries. These top
10 countries are also among the ones where most proxies are located
(see Figure 4). Since Ciao shows how many proxies are available
per country, it is possible that user preferences have been influenced
by this information.
Next, we investigate where most of the traffic is proxied. Fig-
ure 10(b) shows the fraction of downloads and bytes for the top 10
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countries only considering downloads where a country preference
was set (70% of the time). In this case, the distribution is heavily
skewed towards the top 10 locations accounting, overall, for about
60% of all downloads and bytes transferred. However, the ranking
between the two figures is fairly similar.
Figure 10(c) shows the distribution of “geo-localized” Ciao traf-
fic, i.e., traffic associated with a webpage hosted in the same country
of the proxy being used. For this analysis, we temporarily (one
month) extended the statistics collected by Ciao (see Section 3,
phase IV) with a boolean value indicating whether the location of a
requested website is the same of the proxy used. Website location is
inferred by Ciao via website top level domain, if it is representative
of a country, or via third party services providing website-to-location
mapping.7 Ciao users have been informed of this data collection via
a message shown on the proxy selection interface.
Figure 10(c) shows that, on average, the websites accessed via
a free proxy and the proxy itself are hosted in the same country
for 30% of downloads and 20% of bytes. Further, we observe no
geo-localized traffic for half of the countries. This results suggests
that geo-blocking avoidance is not a prominent use-case for free web
proxies. However, the figure also shows some countries with high
percentages of geo-localized traffic, e.g., 60% in the US.
The geo-localized traffic observed in Figure 10(c) could be at-
tempts to access popular geo-blocked services like Hulu or Netflix
in the US. In absence of URL visibility, we investigate whether these
users are particularly concerned about leaking their IP/location, i.e.,
are more likely to request anonymous and elite proxies. We find that
for these downloads anonymous proxies are the most popular choice
(70%)—while normally being the least popular choice—followed
by transparent (23%) and elite (7%). Even if elite proxies provide
a higher anonymity level than anonymous ones, they are less likely
used to access geo-blocked content. This may be due to their name
that does not clearly highlight strong anonymity to non-expert users,
differently from anonymous proxies.
Finally, we investigate which type of content is downloaded when
using free web proxies. Our analysis relies on the little information
Ciao collects to preserve its users privacy, i.e., download size and
duration. Figure 11 shows a scatterplot of the size of each download
(bytes) as a function of its duration (seconds). 95% of downloads
are short (< 1 minute) and contain, on average, 500 KBytes. Even
though 500 KBytes is less than the size of an average webpage —
httparchive8 reports it to be 2.9 MBytes — these downloads relate
to regular web browsing. The smaller download size we observe is
due to: 1) httparchive derives its statistics from crawling Alexa’s
top webpages while our workload is driven by real users that may
visit a different set of websites, 2) our download size estimation is
a lower bound on the actual webpage size as Ciao is oblivious to
data retrieved from the browser’s cache. Figure 11 also shows a non-
negligible amount of downloads lasting several minutes (0.1%) and
containing few 100 MBytes, as well as two very long downloads (up
to couple of hours) containing few GBytes. These large downloads
could be due to software or video downloads, live streaming, etc.
We speculate the latter since no additional browsing activity was
observed during these long sessions, i.e., the user did not perform any
7http://ip-api.com, http://www.ip-tracker.org/domain-to-location.php
8http://httparchive.org/
Figure 11: Scatterplot of download size and duration.
other download suggesting that she could be watching the content
being retrieved.
Takeaway: Ciao has proven to be a valuable tool to shed some
lights on how free proxies are used. By analyzing 2 TBytes of traffic
generated by 1,500 users over 7 months, we identify web browsing
as the most prominent user activity. Overall, geo-blocking avoidance
is not a prominent use-case for free web proxies, with exception of
countries hosting a lot of geo-blocked content like the US.
Fueled by an increasing need of anonymity and censorship cir-
cumvention, the (free) web proxy ecosystem has been growing wild
in the last decade. Such ecosystem consists, potentially, of millions
of hosts, whose reachability and performance information are scat-
tered across multiple forums and websites. Studying this ecosystem
is hard because of its large scale, and because it involves two players
out of reach: free proxies and their users. The key contributions of
this work are ProxyTorrent, a distributed measurement platform
for the free proxy ecosystem, and an analysis of 10 months of data
spanning up to 180,000 free proxies and 1,500 users. ProxyTorrent
leverages a funnel-based testing methodology to actively monitor
hundreds of thousand free proxies every day. Further, it leverages
free proxies users to understand how proxies perform and how they
are used in the wild. The latter is achieved via a Chrome plugin we
developed which simplifies the hard task of finding a working and
safe free proxy in exchange of anonymous proxy usage statistics.
Our analysis shows that the free proxy ecosystem consists of a very
small and volatile core, less than 2% of all announced proxies with a
lifetime of few days. Only half of the proxies in this core have good
enough performance to be used. However, users should be aware
that about 10% of the best working proxies are “free for a reason”:
ads injection and TLS interception are two examples of malicious
behavior we observed from such proxies. Finally, the analysis of
more than 2 Terabytes of proxied traffic shows that free proxies are
mostly used for web browsing and that geo-blocking avoidance is
not a prominent use-case.
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